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SEVEN PADĀRTHAS TARKA
165 revealing; these sub-classes he dismisses as impossible.26 Thus he actually rejects the second sub-class on the simple ground that it is not at all a case of a probans existing in a vipaksa, but not explicitly stating this ground he argues at length why a case coming under this sub-class is not a case of generating a doubt; the argument is muddled and only towards the end of the whole discussion is it submitted that even if this case (as also a case coming under the third sub-class) is a case of generating a doubt that is no reason why it should be brought under the present hetvābhāsa-type whose essential definition is 'a probans existing in a vipaksa', a definition obviously not fulfilled by this case.27 The noteworthy thing is that the later Nyāya authors actually bring this case under the present hatvābhāsa-type and precisely on the ground that it is a case of gererating a doubt. Then Jayanta raises an objection against the third sub-type posited by the Buddhist, the former's simple point being that it is impossible for there to be two valid probantia in the same locus, one necessitating the presence of the probandum concerned the other necessitating its absence.28 And as just noted, Jayanta in the end submits that even if an alledged case of this sub-type is a case of generating a doubt that is no reason why it should be brought under the present hatvābhāsa-type whose essential definition
is 'a probans existing in a vipaksa', a definition hardly fulfilled by * this case. However, here again the noteworthy thing is that it is actually the cases belonging to this sub-class that the later Nyāya authors treat as cases of the hetvābhāsa-type satpratipaksa (here called prakaranasama), a hetvābhāsa-type understood by Jayanta in an altogether different fashion.
(ii) Viruddha The aphorism laying down the definition of the hetvābhāsa-type viruddha is obscurely worded. For it seems to say that a case of viruddha occurs when someone first accepts a doctrine and then says something that opposes this doctrine.29 This looks like the classical description of the hetvābhāsa-type satpratipakşa, and may be some such thing was actually had in mind by the aphorist whose own understading of satpratipakșa (here called prakaranasama) was different. In any case, Vātsyāyana understands the aphorism in question in some such way and in this connection quotes the example of a Sānkhya debater arguing that a modification-of-Prakrti
