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SEVEN PADĀRTHAS TARKA
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understanding referring to his earlier refusal to treat a case like this as a sub-type of the pseudo-probans anaikāntika and to his coming refusal to treat a case like this as a sub-type of the pseudo-probans bādhita, his point (already noted by us) being that such a case is an impossibility:33 So, according to Jayanta (as according to Vātsyāyana) a case of pseudo-probans prakaranasama arises when in connection with some point the very circumstance which necessitates the resort to an inference is proposed as a probans supposed to settle this point, something which seems to be the natural meaning of the aphorism in question.34 The case is illustrated by somebody inferring 'a word is eternal, because there is not observed in it a feature chatacteristic of things non-eternal' and also a word is non-eternal, because there is not observed in it a feature characteristic of things eternal.'35 Really, it is a very artificial case (in fact, the only case of its type) and Jayanta's only consolation is that this case is not covered by any of the remaining four hetvābhāsa-types as understood by him.36
(iv) Asiddha The aphorist says that the hetvābhāsa-type asiddha is that probans which itself standing in need of demonstration is akin to what is sought to be demonstrated.37 This statement too creates some difficulty for Jayanta who notes that a probans altogether incapable of being demonstrated should belong to this type but that such a probans cannot be called 'something standing in need of demonstration', and his solution of the difficulty lies in suggesting that a general definition of the hetvābhāsa-type asiddha should leave out the anomalous part in question; thus according to him a case of asiddha arises when the proposed probans either is incapable of being demonstrated or stands in need of being demonstrated, in the latter case one party to debate being doubtful about the presence of this probans in the locus concerned.18 But then the opponent objects that in all debate the proposed probans must be such that both the parties are agreed as to its presence in the locus concerned; Jayanta replies : “That is true. But suppose a debater proposes a probans and the rival raises doubt about its presence in the locus concerned; then the original debater will have to demonstrate the presence of this probans in this locus. If he succeeds he (otherwise the rival) will score a debating point."39
