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INDIAN LOGIC
nature of a practical adage. This becomes clear in the course of a defence offered by Jayanta in reply to the Buddhist Dharmakirti's charge that to say things that do not contribute to demonstration and not to point out defects in the rival's argument - these two are the only nigrahasthānas, for Jayanta in essence pleads: "The two elements of your definition properly interpreted simply repeat the two elements of our definition. As for the twenty two types of nigrahasthāna posited by us they do not give an exhaustive list but an illustrative list." But Dharmakīrti's very contention is that after: having discussed the logical doctrine of pseudo-probans (pseudothesis and pseudo-example, there is no need for separately discussing a doctrine of nigrahasthāna, the simple point being that one is declared defeated in a debate in case one is proved to have offered a pseudo-probans. It is in the light of this general understanding that Dharmakirti raises objections against the Nyāya concept of twenty two nigrahasthānas, and Jayanta while elaborating this concept seeks, to meet these objections as best he can. On the whole, however, the truth lies in what Dharmakirti says. In any case, barring exceptions the twenty two nigrahasthāna-types are such that an occasion for them arises only in the course of a debate conducted in a private gathering and not in one conducted through written texts; this should become clear if these types are considered one by one.
1. Pratijñā-hāni (=damaging one's thesis) : When the rival submits that the homologue example cited by one lacks rather than possesses the probandum concerned and one concedes the validity of this submission then one is faced with this nigrahasthāna-type. (As Dharmakirti rightly notes, this is a simple case of offering a pseudo-probans.)
2. Pratijñāntara (= changing one's thesis) : When in reply to the rival's objection one adds a new element to his original thesis then one is faced with this nigrahasthāna-type. (This too will be a simple case of offering a pseudo-probans - unless the additional element in question only makes explicit what was originally implicit.)
3. Pratijñāvirodha (= contradicting one's thesis) : When the probans offered by one contradicts one's thesis one is faced with this nigrahasthāna-type. (This is obviously a case of offering a pseudo-probans.)
4. Pratijñāsaṁnyāsa (= giving up one's thesis) : When in reply to the rival's objection one altogether gives up his thesis then one
