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INDIAN LOGIC
a particular similarity proves a particular character. [Here again is a general point leading nowhere.)
(19) The opponent might argue that both the thesis that a word is non-eternal and the counter-thesis that a word is eternal are. equally possible; he has to be told that the thesis is more plausible. (An old point.)
(20) The opponent might argue that a word is said to be noneternal because it is produced through an effort but that a thing might be non-eternal without being produced through an effort (e.g. lightning is non-eternal without being produced through an effort); he has to be told that a thing might be non-eterrnal even without being produced through an effort but that it is certainly non-eternal when it is produced through an effort. [Here the real question is as to how an invariable concomitance is to be established, a question. not properly posed by the old Nyāya authors.]
(21) The opponent might argue that the non-cognition of the coverage concealing a word is not cognized - which means that this coverage is cognized, this in turn meaning that a word is eternal though usually concealed by a coverage; he has to be told that a non-cognition is a matter of direct introspection, so that there is actually no coverage concealing a word. [Really, here is involved the Mimāṁsaka's contention that a word is eternal though usually unmanifest, but the way it is here disposed of is curious.)
(22) The opponent might argue that if a word is non-eternal because of its one similarity with a jar then all things of the world must be non-eternal because of their having some similarity or other with a jar; he has to be told that the former similarity is a welldefined similarity. (The point is that the similarity in question is not defined precisely enough.]
(23) The opponent might argue that if the non-eternity of a word is itself non-eternal then the word must be at times eternal, but that if this non-eternity is itself eternal then too the word which is the seat of this non-eternity must be eternal; he has to be told that to say that a word is eternally non-eternal is to say that it is never eternal, not that it is somehow eternal. [The opponent's argument is obviously sophistical.)
(24) The opponent might argue that an effort is required not only to produce a thing but also to reveal an already existing thing,
