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ceases to appear because it is something non-eternal, an argument opposing this debater's accepted doctrine that even while disappearing a modification-of-Prakrti continues to be there because it is something eternal; Jayanta takes explicit note of Vātsyāyana's understanding of the matter and rejects it on the ground that this way we get some other defect-of-demonstration but not the pseudoprobans viruddha.30 For following the clear-cut Buddhist practice Jayanta would say that a case of viruddha occurs when the proposed probans succeeds in proving just the opposite of what it is supposed to prove, a statement he reads (at the cost of some violence to vocabulary as well as grammar) into the actual words of the aphorism in question; thus according to him while a valid probans ought to exist in some (or all) sapaksa and in no vipaksa a pseudoprobans of the type viruddha exists in no sapaksa and in some (or all) vipaksa, thus necessitating the absence rather than presence of the probandum concerned in the locus concerned. Again, keeping in mind the corresponding Buddhist procedure Jayanta offers the clarification that even if the pseudo-probans viruddha violates two conditions of a valid probans, viz. (1) that it should exist in some (or all) sapaksa and (2) that it should exist in no vipaksa, what is characteristic to it is the violation of the first of these conditions inasmuch as the second is violated even by the pseudo-probans savyabhicāra.32 Really, the practice of laying down certain conditions of a valid probans and defining pseudo-probans in terms of the violation on its part of this or that among these conditions was a practice originating in Buddhist circles and borrowed from there by the later Nyāya authors.
(iii) Prakaranasama (= Satpratipaksa) The aphorism laying down the definition of the hetvābhāsa-type prakaranasama (in later times better known as satpratipaksa) is also worded obscurely; in any case, the rather understandable meaning attributed to this aphorism by Vātsyāyana and following him by Jayanta does not tally with the later Nyāya understanding of the hetvābhāsa-type satpratipaksa, an understanding according to which a case of it arises when a proposed probans claiming to prove the presence of the probandum concerned in the locus concerned is opposed by another probans proving the absence of this very probandum in this very locus. Jayanta explicitly rejects this
