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but that consciousness is produced in it when it performs acts like cognition, desire etc., a position that invited ridicule from the other advocates of soul-doctrine who would have us believe that a soul is somehow ever-conscious. It is this rather unenviable position which Jayanta defends on the one hand against the materialist, on the other hand against the Prabhākarite whose endeavour to demonstrate that soul is something ever-conscious is most fantastic of all and one that came in handy for a school like Advaita-vedānta with its illusionist thesis that there exists nothing but one soul called Brahman.
Lastly, Jayanta criticises those of his own Nyāya colleagues who maintained that a soul is an object of preception. The opponent begins by arguing his case as follows : "If it is really impossible for a soul to act as an agent cogniser as well as an object cognised then an inferential cognition of a soul should be as much impossible as a perceptual cognition of it."'13 Jayanta asks : “But a soul had got what form which one might cognise through a perception ?"; the opponent asks in return : “Pleasure etc. have got what form which one cognises through a manas-born perception ?!'!4 Jayanta answers : "Pleasure etc. are obviously of the form of joy etc."; the opponent retorts : "Likewise, a soul is what acts as a locus for pleasure etc. After all, pleasure etc. are not cognised as something existing all by themselves, so that whatever be cognised in the form of their locus is a soul. Certainly, a pleasure is not cognised in the form 'this is a pleasure', just as a jar is cognised in the form 'this is a jar.' So, when one cognises 'I am pleased one cognises a pleasure as well as the soul concerned."! We have ourselves earlier taken exception to Jayanta's position on these very lines; in particular, we have suggested that the most sensible position for a Nyāya author to take is that whenever a quality of a soul is preceived the soul concerned too' is perceived, a position actually maintained by the present opponent. It is really gratifying that Jayanta is explicitly aware of all this criticism that might possibly be levelled against his own position, but he sticks to this position because the early Nyāya authors have only said that such and such things are to act as a probans for inferring a soul. So the opponent now decides to base his stand on this very statement of the early Nyāya authors. Thus he argues : "Cognition, desire, pleasure, pain etc. have been declared to be a probans for inferring a soul. For as existing in one common
