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all, this irrespective of how according to him a cognition itself is cognised. (A relevant point in this connection would have been that since according to the Kumārilite a cognition is something inherently imperceptible he should rather contend that the cognition to the effect 'I desire this object' is a perceptual cognition even if that to the effect 'I cognise this object' is not, but this is a point of which Jayanta has no inkling.) For his criticism of the present Kumārilite position Jayanta seeks support by pointing out that the idealist Buddhist denied the reality of an external object on the ground that a cognition cognises itself (rather than an external object)'; but one point is that the Sautrāntika Buddhist too says that a cognition cognises itself and yet he does not deny the reality of an external object, the real point is that in the context of the question whether a soul cognises itself or not it is an irrelevant consideration whether a cognition cognises itself or not. Thus we are left in the dark as to why the Kumārilite insists and Jayanta denies that a soul is a possible object of perception.
Then Jayanta criticises the Prabhākarite mode of arguing that a soul is an object of perception. We have already hinted that the real difficulty in this connection is that no particular light on the problem is thrown by a consideration of how perception takes place in the case of a physical object. The difficulty becomes very plain now. For the Prabhākarite has borrowed his so peculiar framework of argumentation from the Buddhists who had said so many odd things about cognition. Thus basing themselves on the trivial circumstance that after having had a cognition nobody can fail to remain aware that he had had this cognition these Buddhists submitted that all cognition necessarily cognises itself. Then the hint was thrown that a cognition cognising itself requires no special endeavour of any sort just as a light reveals itself through its mere coming into existence. Again, it was believed that cognition had by a person must constitute an uninterrupted series, it being thought impossible that if once interrupted this series should start de novo. [To all this the idealists among the Buddhists added that there exist no physical objects by the side of so many cognition-series that are there.) Now what the Buddhists thus said about a cognition-series the Prabhākarite made use of in his description of a soul. Thus he submitted that just as a flame of light burning over there illumines constantly and automatically a soul is something ever conscious and
