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96
INDIAN LOGIC
position a physical thing acts as an object of perception only when it is being identified on the basis of certain observed sensory quality of it; however, since it is always understood that a sensory quality belongs to a physical thing even the case of noticing a sensory quality without identifying the concerned physical thing can be said to be a case of perceiving a physical thing in the form of an indeterminate 'something?.. But even granting for argument's sake that a soul exists and is possessed of the qualities cognition, desire etc. the fact remains that there is no question of thus identifying a soul on the basis of certain observed qualities of it, so that the sensible position ought to be that a soul is perceived whenever a quality of it is perceived. However, this simple position, is conceded by just one of the four parties appearing in the present controversy and that obscures the point of this controversy. Thus the Kumārilite argues that a soul is an object of perception because in the statements like 'I cognise this object', 'I desire this object' etc. the word 'I' stands for a soul; the objection that in a statement like 'I am fat' the word 'I must stand for a body rather than a soul is rejected on the ground that in this statement a body is figuratively meant by the word 'l' which literally means nothing but a soul. It is difficult to see how this argument has a bearing on the question whether or not a soul is an object of perception; for while criticising it Jayanta submits that the word 'l' stands for a body rather than a soul, so that in the statements like 'I cognise this object', 'I desire this object' etc. a soul is figuratively meant by this word which literally means nothing but a body. Really, the word T occurring in a statement stands for the speaker concerned; but if some philosopher has persuaded himself that a speaker consists of a body and a soul then according to him this word as occurring in a statement which mentions the qualities of a soul stands for a soul while the same as occurring in a statement which mentions the qualities of a body stands for a body. But then Jayanta has also something else to say against the present Kumārilite position. Thus he argues that in the case of a cognition the agent and the object cannot be one and the same thing just as on the Kumārilite's own admission a cognition cannot be its own object. Really, however, if a philosopher is of the view that all cognition is cognition on the part of a soul then he cannot avoid conceding either that a soul cognises itself or that a soul is not cognised at
