________________
100
INDIAN LOGIC
locus they indicate the presence of a 'co-ordinater (= agent coordinating an earlier experience and a present one).' But they as existing in a common locus cannot be cognised unless this locus is itself cognised. However, if this locus is already cognised, there remains nothing to be inferred; on the other hand, unless this locus is cognised the inference in question is impossible. So, it is a safer position that a soul is an object of perception."!6 This argument Jayanta answers by explaining how desire, aversion, effort, pleasure, pain, cognition can be used as a probans for inferring a soul without necessitating the presupposition that a soul is an object of perception. In essence he first contends that desire, aversion, effort, cognition of the form of recognition (though not that of the form of freshcognition) all presuppose the coordination of an earlier experience and a present one while being of the form of a quality these desire; aversion etc. must be supposed to be seated in a locus of the form of a substance; and then he concludes that the coordination in question being not possible on the part of body etc. the substance in question must be a soul." This way Jayanta seeks to answer the opponent who had argued that a 'coordinater' in the form of a soul cannot be inferred from desire, etc. unless two experiences as seated in the same locus are first perceived but that to thus perceive these two experiences is already to perceive a soul as their common locus; for the former is now telling the latter that what is here inferred is not 'coordination from 'co-location but vice versa. However, aware of certain difficulties Jayanta does not make this point directly but after some amount of side-talking. Thus he first emphasises that a soul is posited because being of the form of a quality desire etc. need a locus of the form of a substance; to this is added that he here speaks of 'coordination because that is not possible on the part of body etc.18 But the opponent forces Jayanta to pointedly explain how 'coordination is not possible on the part of body etc; the former's point is that if the latter argues that 'coordination' is not possible on the part of body etc. because it has been found possible only on the part of a soul then the latter has already conceded that a soul as undertaking 'coordination has been perceived." In a nutshell, Jayanta is being asked as to why 'coordination must imply colocation'. He could have said in fact, this is what he does say) that on analysis it is found that the concept 'coordination implies the concept 'co-location’; but the usual practice of Indian logicians
