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INDIAN LOGIC
exhibits difference, a non-momentary thing exhibits sameness."41 The idea is that a real thing must quit the scene as soon as it is born while an alleged non-momentary thing must continue to exist even after it is born; that may be so, but the point is that the idea is here substantiated by no new argument.
(3) Thirdly, it is argued that even on the admission of the Naiyāyikas and Mimāṁsakas a thing acts as a cause only for the moment when the causation concerned is actually taking place, so that since a real thing is what acts as a cause a real thing ought to be something momentary even according to these philosophers. 42 The difficulty with this argument is that the opponent would not concede that a thing is real only when it is actually acting as a cause, it being his understanding that a non-momentary thing'exists for a longer or shorter duration while acting as a cause, only when the needed accessories are available. So, the Buddhist has to convince him that a real thing cannot exist without acting as a cause, a position which is a corollary to the position that a real thing cannot but perish as soon as it is born; for while perishing as soon as born the outgoing member of a thing-series causes the incoming member of this series. Fortunately, the Buddhist's next argument is actually aimed at establishing the position that a real thing cannot but perish as soon as it is born.
(4) Thus lastly it is argued that a real thing is momentary in duration because it requires no cause for its destruction, the point being that if a thing must perish then it must perish without requiring a cause while the opponent himself concedes that whatever is a produced entity must be a perishing entity.43 This most telling argument in support of momentarism is not appreciated by the opponent simply because he does not take seriously his own position that a produced entity must be a perishing entity. Thus he asks the Buddhist that if a jar (for example) must perish automatically then why one has to hit a stick against this jar in order to break it into potsherds; the former has to be told that this jar must break up into potsherds sooner or later while by hitting a stick against it one only hastens this breaking up. The Buddhist's own usual reply is different and one that clearly explains how destruction and causation are two inseparable aspects of one and the same process. For he says that the c se of a stick breaking up a jar into potsherds is a case of a jar-mcent producing a potsherd
