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INDIAN LOGIC
but whether or not it is tenable, his point being that to posit a cognition without positing the object concerned is an untenable hypothesis. In this connection the idealist has argued that even if an object exists besides the cognition concerned this cognition must bear the form of this object or there will be nothing to distinguish one cognition from another; Jayanta retorts that even if a cognition does not bear the form of its object causal analysis well reveals as to why one cognition has this thing for its object another cognition that thing; the idealist objects that on the opponent's showing nothing should decide why some one particular thing from among the causal aggregate should act as object; Jayanta retorts that this way even on the idealist's showing nothing should decide why some one particular thing from among the causal aggregate should impart its form to the cognition concerned. Really, the controversy as to whether or not a cognition has got a form is pointless and the important thing is Jayanta's insistence that a cognition must have for its object a thing existing independently of this cognition; and he convincingly shows how concomitance-in-presence and concomitance-in-absence enable one to decide as to what cognition has got what thing for its object. 68 A famous idealist saying is that a cognition and its object are one because the two are always observed together; Jayanta retorts that if x and y are always observed together then it is obvious that x and y are not one.69 Then the idealist has submitted that in the case of a hallucination etc. there is no object corresponding to the cognition concerned; this leads Jayanta to undertake a somewhat detailed examination of two idealist theories of illusion, incidentally remarking that he has already criticised the corresponding Prabhākarite theory and established the corresponding Nyāya theory; of these two. idealist theories in question one maintains that in an illusion something utterly non-existing appears as something existing, the other that here a cognition appears as an external object.7o Arguing against the first theory Jayanta notes that illusions are of two types - one where a sense-organ misperceives an actually existing thing, the other where mind (= manas) projects before eyes something while practically nothing actually exists there; and his point is that in the former case an object besides the cognition concerned obviously exists while in the latter case too there often obtains a meagre objective basis and there never is projected a thing that exists nowhere." The opponent asks :“But how
