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156
INDIAN LOGIC
of perception, inference, analogy or verbal testimony, one where the qualifier-part or qualificand-part is fictitious, one which stands selfproved.
Then comes the second avayava hetu which consists in stating that the locus-of-inference possesses the probans concerned. But the relevant Nyāyasūtra aphorisms do not convey this much simple information about this avayava; for here the first aphorism says: “On the basis of observing similarity between the present case and an example, to prove what is to be proved - that is hetu”, to which the second adds: “On the basis of observing dissimilarity between the present case and an example, to prove what is to be proved that is hetu,"3" This is to say that a valid probans is one which on the basis of observing homologue and heterologue instances has been shown to have a relation of invariable concomitance with the probandum concerned. But as a matter of fact, it is the third avayava drstānta that consists in stating the concerned relation of invariable concomitance and quoting an illustrative example. So what Jayanta is presently saying is directly relevant for understanding the third rather than the second avayava, that also being why the account of the third avayava just describes what an example is (the description suited to the actual - though misleading - title of this avayava). But then Jayanta has introduced another complication while interpreting the two aphorisms related to the second avayava. For according to the natural meaning of these aphorisms - which was also their traditionally understood meaning - the first refers to cases where a homologue example is mentioned, the second to cases where a heterologue example is mentioned; but according to Jayanta the first aphorism refers to cases where a homologue example too can be quoted while the second to cases where a heterologue example alone can be quoted, it being understood that in the former cases a heterologue example too can be quoted inasmuch as there are not possible cases where a homologue example alone can be quoted. Really, the alleged cases of inference where a homologue example alone can be quoted and ones where a heterologue example alone can be quoted are both highly artificial but ultimately both came to be accepted by the Nyāya school; Jayanta, however, had qualms about the validity of the former cases and was convinced of the high utility of the latter ones, and so he interpreted the aphorisms in question in the way just described, frankly admitu ? all this as also that in all this he was deviating from the tradition ini ted by Vātsyāyana.”' Thus
