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INDIAN LOGIC
this thing actually exists, it being the case that things observed under an illusion do not actually exist;*.
(iv) when one fails to observe a thing but is not sure whether or not this thing is actually absent, it being the case that things not observed owing to a concealment actually exist."
As can be seen, the correct and essential definition of doubt is here already given at the outset while the four additional cases add nothing important to this definition. [It is in connection with the first additional case that Vätsyäyana cites an example of one observing that sound is produced by a disjunction but is not sure whether or not it is a quality." The opponent says that since a disjunction is produced by a disjunction and is a quality sound too is a quality," The Naiyayika replies: "The disjunction produced by a disjunction is of two types, but sound produced by a disjunction follows the pattern of just one of these disjunction-types. So the fact that sound is produced by a disjunction is a unique fact and observing merely this fact one cannot be sure whether or not sound is a quality. And then some of us do not at all admit that there is anything like disjunction produced by a disjunction; and these people will insist that sound alone is what can possibly be produced by a disjunction." Nay, some of us go to the extent of saying that what is ordinarily called disjunction is but the destruction of an earlier obtaining conjunction; so according to them in the expression 'sound produced by a disjunction' the word 'disjunction' stands for some speciality peculiarly produced in sky where sound is produced, this being why they too would grant that sound alone is what' can possibly be produced by a disjunction." It is this reply given by the Naiyayika which Jayanta describes in details dilating upon the notoriously obscure controversy as to whether or not disjunction produced by a disjunction is possible; but this whole reply is little relevant for understanding the phenomenon of doubt as such.] Thus in connection with the first additional case the Naiyayika's point is that since there can obtain no invariable concomitance between an exclusive quality belonging to a thing and another quality, the presence of this exclusive quality ensures the presence of no other quality in this thing, a point rather understandable but one not generally considered while undertaking a treatment of doubt. Similarly, in connection with the second additional case the Naiyayika's point is that different philosophers might uphold even mutually contradictory positions on
