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FIVE PADARTHAS SAMSAYA...
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one and the same question, in connection with the third and fourth that a mere superficial observation or non-observation does not ensure the existence or non-existence of the thing sought to be observed, all rather understandable points but such as are not generally considered while undertaking a treatment of doubt. Really, in the classical Nyaya logic doubt is defined as is here defined in the original case and the question arises as to why the early Nyaya authors posited the additional four cases in question. What happened was that the early Nyäya authors took interest in the problem of doubt in a context that was different from that faced by the later Nyäya authors. For the later Nyaya authors would define valid cognition and contrast it with invalid cognition on the one hand and doubt on the other; the early Nyaya authors would discuss the role doubt plays in an inferential demonstration in general and a public debate in particular. Naturally, therefore, the later Nyaya authors had use only for the original case envisaged in the Nyāyasūtra aphorism in question while the early Nyaya authors were equally eager to utilise the additional four cases which were even more relevant for the purposes of a demonstration or a debate. Lastly, we might note that ingenious attempt made by certain Nyaya authors to drop certain words from the aphorism to yield a general definition of doubt. Really, the general definition of doubt given above is a definition áccording to these authors. For this definition says that doubt arises when on observing certain features in an entity one is reminded of two things which both share these features while there are not being observed in this entity any features belonging to either of these two things, but the original aphorism contains no words corresponding to the expression "while there are not being observed in this entity any features belonging to either of these two things", and the authors in question derive this expression from words which naturally (and according to the other interpretation of these authors themselves) describe the third and fourth additional cases", so that dropping the words describing first and second additional cases they formulate a general definition of doubt while utilising the whole of the aphorism for formulating a definition of the five types of doubt. Of course, the difficulty these authors were seeking to meet in this ingenious fashion was a genuine difficulty. For the aphorism in question said that doubt is such and such a cognition produced under these five conditions and since there was given no separate general definition
