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INDIAN LOGIC
of doubt such a definition was to be derived from the phrase standing here for ‘such and such a cognition.' This phrase was 'višesāpeksa vimarsa' and this these authors found inadequate for the purpose; and so getting additional elements in the manner described they formulated a general definition of doubt. Jayanta also reports about another group of interpreters who, dissatisfied with this manner of formulating a general definition of doubt (particularly because the words describing the third and fourth additional cases are here given two entirely different meanings in the case of the two interpretations in question) got this definition from the phrase "višesāpekṣa vimarsa' itself; they on their part exhibited ingenuity in giving a special meaning to the word 'vimarsa' which the former group of interpreters has understood to mean simply 'cognition' or the like. 12 The noteworthy thing is that both groups were living in times when the four additional cases in question were not taken into any special consideration when the phenomenon of doubt was under investigation, and so both were having the same general definition in mind, a definition which should suit these later times; but since the early Nyāya authors must have been equally serious about these additional cases they must be having in mind some other general definition somehow to be yielded by the phrase 'višesāpekṣa vimarśa.' As to what this general definition was and how it was to be yielded by this phrase we cannot be very much sure.
(2) Prayojana (Purpose) The fourth padārtha is prayojana or purpose. Thus the aphorist says that purpose is that thing in respect of which one undertakes an activity." Almost certainly the early Nyāya authors must have paid attention to the problem of purpose because all demonstration or debate aims at serving some purpose, but in Jayanta's explanation of the present aphorism this aspect of the matter comes into picture just in passing when he tells us that even that debater who is interested just in refuting a rival's thesis and not in establishing his own has for his purpose this refutation itself. For the rest he utilises the occasion to discuss a point which he has so prominently emphasised while maintaining that result-of-the-action-concerned is the chief element in a sentential meaning; thus he here notes down that in all activity the chief purpose is the attainment of pleasure or avoidance of pain while a secondary purpose might be the
