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INDIAN LOGIC
because otherwise it should be impossible to distinguish one cognition from another which both qua a cognition must be absolutely identical.95 Then is refuted the rival assertion that one cognition cannot be distinguished from another unless the two have to do with two different objects; the point of the refutation is that in a cognition there do not appear two forms, that the idea of a cognition being cognised by another cognition leads to infinite regress, that if a cognition be conceived as self-cognitive then there is no warrant for positing an object besides this cognition.56 In this connection it is submitted that one cognition differs from another because the two are occasioned by two different past impressions, not because they are produced by two different objects;57 to this is added that in the case of a hallucination, a memory or a dream there obviously is no object corresponding to the cognition concerned and this goes to further refute the hypothesis of an extra-cognitive object, a hypothesis already refuted owing to all absence of the separate existence of a cognition and the object concerned. Lastly it is argued that since the same object is differently cognised under different circumstances there is in fact no object apart from the cognition concerned.59 As can be seen, the idealist refuses to recognise the simple fact that a cognition is by definition the cognition of an object, a refusal in comparison to which the mistakes vitiating the details of his account of a cognition are secondary; and it is on account of the recognition of this very fact that Jayanta's refutation of idealism makes so much sense in spite of so many mistakes vitiating the details of his account of a cognition. Thus, for example, the discussion as to whether or not a cognition bears a form and the discussion as to whether or not a cognition is selfcognitive loom large in the present controvery, but both are in essence pointless discussions. Be that as it may, Jayanta begins by submitting that a plain observation of concomitance-in-presence and concomitance-in-absence establishes that a cognition is one thing the object cognised by it another.60 To this is added that a cognition is referred to an 'I', an object is referred to a 'this'.61 It is conceded that in a cognition there do not appear two forms, the point being that this form belongs to the object concerned and not to this cognition itself.62 But the idealist has contended that in a cognition there appears just one form which is the form of this cognition itself while there exists no object besides this cognition; Jayanta retorts :
