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consists either of dogmatic assertions or childish arguments it occupies not much space and he closes it with the mocking remark: "Oh ! our heart having been attracted by the enjoyment produced by the story told by the poet Kapila we have blurted out so many relevant and irrelevant things."53 Really, much of what Jayanta reports is not directly relevant for his purpose and we too confine our attention to what is thus relevant. Thus according to the Sānkhyite cognition takes place when a sense-organ undergoes a modification corresponding to the object concerned while buddhi too undergoes a corresponding modification which gets linked with the former modification; now this latter modification is what the puruşa (= soul) concerned sees - which seeing is no form of activity but a mere casting of a reflection; consequently, buddhi which is really devoid of awareness appears to be possessed of awareness while the purusa which is really devoid of all activity appears to be possessed of an activity.54 In this Jayanta particularly notes that buddhi is distinguished from jñāna on the one hand and upalabdhi on the other - jñāna' being the designation for the above described modification undergone by buddhi and 'upalabdhi' for the above described seeing on the purusa's part; besides, he notes that buddhi is here conceived as the first product of prakrti supposed to be the root-stuff whose modification the whole realm of inanimate things is; lastly, he notes that buddhi is here conceived as something eternal and hence capable of performing acts like 'coordinating a past experience and a present one' which require an eternal agent, also that it is supposed possible that buddhi should cease to function in respect of a purusa which has attained mokșa while continuing to function in respect of one which has not.Obviously, all this is too much for Jayanta who first of all attacks the idea of attributing awareness to a purusa and 'coordination', cognition, ascertainment etc. to buddhi which moreover is treated as something inanimate, his point being that the functions thus attributed to buddhi are the functions of a soul itself so that it is redundant to posit buddhi by the side of a puruṣa. And granting the validity of this duplication it is argued that if cognition consists in buddhi casting reflection in a purusa then it should be impossible to distinguish between buddhi and a purusa inasmuch as the two are now never cognised apart from each other; the suggestion that buddhi being something inanimate easily gets distinguished from a purusa which is not
