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a very lengthy criticism of the Buddhist's general doctrine of momentarism. However, Jayanta has yet to say a few things before he closes his first section, things which were customary for the Nyāya-Vaisesika authors to say. Thus he argues that the reason why an increase or decrease in bodily efficiency results in an increase or decrease in intellectual efficiency is not that consciousness is a property of body but that the sense-organs which are an instrument of acquiring cognition are seated in body.28 Again, it is argued that consciousness cannot be a property of a sense-organ because a conscious activity often involves 'co-ordination between a cognition born of one sense-organ and one born of another, a 'coordination' not possible on the part of any one sense-organ.29 Similarly, it is argued that consciousness cannot be a property of manas because the only two functions of a manas are to prevent the rise of more than one cognition at a time - this through getting connected with one sense-organ at a time - and to act as an instrument for the cognition of the internal qualities like cognition, desire etc. Given Jayanta's basic reasons as to why a soul has to be posited these arguments are rather easy to follow, but some more light will be thrown on them when we consider the next five prameyas which happen to be body, sense-organ, things-cognised-through-sense-organs, cognition, manas. Lastly, Jayanta submits that the earlier advanced reasons as to why a soul has to be posited are just illustrative while so many more such reasons can be advanced with ease.3! Really, in advancing those reasons Jayanta was dilating upon the relevant Nyāya-sūtra aphorism whereas in referring to those additional reasons he is having in mind the relevant Vaiseșika-sūtra aphorisms. Thus adopting the obviously anthropomorphic mode of reasoning characteristic of these Vaiseșikasūtra aphorisms Jayanta summarily tells us that a soul employs a sense-organ just as a man employs an instrument like a sickle, that a soul moves a body in its own interest just as a charioteer moves a chariot in his own interest, that a soul sets in circulation breaths inside a body, that a soul heals up the wounds suffered by a body just as a man repairs his dwelling:32 To this is added that all perceptual cognition of the form of recognition, all inferential cognition, all cognition of the form of analogy, all cognition of the form of verbal testimony presuppose the coordination of a past cognition with a present one, a 'coordination possible only on the part of a permanent cogniser of the form of a soul. Lastly, it is
