Indian Logic Part 03

Author(s): Nagin J Shah
Publisher: Sanskrit Sanskriti Granthmala

Page 59

INDIAN LOGIC
type of ground on which the second view rejects the first view, the second ground the type of the ground on which the first view rejects the second view, for in connection with the former rejection it is emphasised that there is a multitude of relevant particulars, in connection with the latter rejection that practical dealing takes place not in respect of a ‘universal' but in respect of a relevant particular. The first view as here presented confesses that the second view has the advantage of establishing a neat one-one relationship between a word and what it stands for (there being just one universal' corresponding to each word) but it rejects the latter on the ground just mentioned, viz. that practical dealing takes place not in respect to a 'universal' but in respect of a relevant particular;56 as for the ‘universal' concerned this view maintains that a word stands for it not directly but by way of implication. Then comes the second view which is an actual Mimāṁsā view. According to this view there being just one ‘universal' but a multitude of relevant particulars corresponding to a word, what a word directly stands for is a universal' while it stands for a relevant particular not directly but by way of implication.58 As for the objection that practical dealing takes place not in respect of a 'universal' but in respect of a relevant particular this view tamely pleads that there are cases where even practical dealing takes place in respect of a 'universal' rather than a relevant particular; for example, in the Vedic injunction 'bricks are to be arranged in the form of a kite' the word ‘kite' must stand not for a particular kite which is here not required at all but for the universal concerned inasmuch as what is here actually required is the bare form of a kite.So Really, a plea like this amounts to urging that there are cases where the connotation of a word is also its denotation; but such anomalies are to be encountered through out the present discussion. Be that as it may, there lastly comes the third view which is an actual Nyāya view. This view first criticises the second view on the ground that a word should stand for something to which a case-ending or a gender might be possibly applied while such an application is actually impossible in the case of a universal'.60 According to this third view a word stands for the 'universal' concerned as well as the relevant particular (as also for the configuration concerned) and it seems to make sense simply because it can be construed as the commonsense saying that correspondng to each word there is a universal as well