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Causal conditions
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one is trying to win a real nirvāṇa'. It is this false egoism that is to be considered as avidyā. When considered deeply it is found that there is not even the slightest trace of any positive existence. Thus it is seen that if there were no ignorance (avidyā), there would have been no conformations (sanıskāras), and if there were no conformations there would have been no consciousness, and so on; but it cannot be said of the ignorance "I am generating the samskāras," and it can be said of the samskāras "we are being produced by the avidyā.” But there being avidyā, there come the samskāras and so on with other categories too. This character of the pratītyasamutpāda is known as the coming of the consequent depending on an antecedent reason (hetūpanibandha).
It can be viewed from another aspect, namely that of dependence on conglomeration or combination (pratyayopanibandha). It is by the combination (samavāya) of the four elements, space (ākāśa) and consciousness (vijñāna) that a man is made. It is due to earth (prthivi) that the body becomes solid, it is due to water that there is fat in the body, it is due to fire that there is digestion, it is due to wind that there is respiration; it is due to akāśa that there is porosity, and it is due to vijñāna that there is mind-consciousness. It is by their mutual combination that we find a man as he is. But none of these elements think that they have done any of the functions that are considered to be allotted to them. None of these are real substances or beings or souls. It is by ignorance that these are thought of as existents and attachment is generated for them. Through ignorance thus come the samskāras, consisting of attachment, antipathy and thoughtlessness (rāga, dveșa, moha); from these proceed the vijñāna and the four skandhas. These with the four elements bring about name and form (nāmarūpa), from these proceed the senses (sadāyatana), from the coming together of those three comes contact (sparsa); from that feelings, from that comes desire (trsna) and so on. These flow on like the stream of a river, but there is no essence or truth behind them all or as the ground of them all? The phenomena therefore cannot be said to be either existent or non-existent, and no truth can be affirmed of either eternalism (śāśvatavāda) or nihilism (ucchedavāda), and it is for this reason
* See Mädhyamikavrtti (B.T.S.), pp. 101-108.
• Ibid. pp. 209-211, quoted from Sālistambhasätra. Väcaspatimiśra also quotes this passage in his Bhāmati on Sankara's Brahma-sūtra.
