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BOOK I: THE PRINCIPLE OF KNOWLEDGE
229
arranged as the modifications of all substances in the three times, is called omnipresent. And also the Holy One, because he consists of such like knowledge, is omnipresent. And so all objects (artha), inasmuch as they are the objects (vishaya) of omnipresent knowledge, are called the objects (vishaya) of the Holy One, who is never deprived of omnipresent knowledge; and, since they are so called, they belong to him.
According to the [internal, self-referential] nishchaya-mode of statement, the Holy One, it is true, knows without moving himself towards all the appearances of the knowables, since he never leaves his own reality (svatattva), i.e. knowledge with the extension of the self, characterized by its being the abode of a consciousness (samvedana) of bliss demarked by serenity; however, according to the [extgernal, other-referential] vyavahara-mode the Holy One is said to be everywhere.
Similarly, the objects are said metaphorically to belong to him, whilst one considers the appearances of knowables which are auxiliary causes (naimittika) to be based on the self; but in the transcendental sense (paramarthena) of the word there is no mutual going towards each other, since all substances abide in their own characteristicnature. The same argumentation must be understood with reference to knowledge.
Now he considers the identity and non-identity of self and knowledge:
27. The doctrine is that knowledge is the self. There is no knowledge without the self; therefore knowledge is the self. But the self is knowledge and something else [also).
Since knowledge cannot exist without the self—for knowledge arises, requiring, and using as basis, the self alone, which shows towards it a beginning-less and endless relation of inherence, ensuing from its innate nature, and which, with reference to all other, unconscious things (vastu), has no tendency towards such a relation of inherence—therefore we may say that knowledge is the self. But the self, inasmuch as it is the seat of innumerable properties (dharma), may be knowledge owing to its property of knowledge, while owing to some other property it may be something else. Moreover, the manysided view (anekant) here prevails. By the one-sided view (ekanta), according to which the self is knowledge, the non-existence of
