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BOOK II: THE PRINCIPLE OF KNOWLEDGE
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(ayata-vishesha), they result no less from the just now defined substances and qualities both.
(1d) The substantial-modification (dravya-paryaya) has for condition the apprehending of an unity which contains many substances. It is of two kinds, homogeneous and heterogeneous.
(1d-1) The homogeneous substantial-modification consists of several particles of matter (molecules), thus of two, three atoms, etc.
(1d-2) Heterogeneous substantial-modifications are e.g. a god, a man; they consist of soul and matter.
(1e) The qualitative-modification (guna-paryaya) has for condition the apprehending of lengthwise-manifoldness (ayata-anaikya) owing to qualities. It also is of two kinds, modifications of innate-nature (svabhava) and modifications of derivative-nature (
(le-1) The innate qualitative-modification belonging to all substances is their being subject to manifoldness of increase and decrease, which take place in the six sthanasand arise in succession of time through their respective a-guru-laghu-qualities. 34
(le-2) The derivative qualitative-modification of colours, etc., and intellections (cognitive), etc., is the accession of a manifoldness of particular innate nature, which manifoldness is shown by a higheror-lower-degree (taratamya) with reference to former and later states, and is conditioned by the thing itself or something else (sva-para pratyaya).
This now he confirms by an example:
(2a) Just as every piece of cloth results from a persisting collection of crosswise-generalities and a passing collection of lengthwise generalities, and consists of these, 35 so every object (padartha) results from a persisting collection of crosswise-generalities and a passing collection of lengthwise-generalities, which collections bear the name of substance; and it consists of substance.
(2b) And, just as in the piece of cloth the persisting collection of crosswise-generalities or the passing collection of lengthwisegeneralities, as resulting from the qualities, has the qualities for self, since it is not perceived apart from the qualities, so in [all] objects the persisting collection of crosswise-generalities or the passing collection of lengthwise-generalities, which bears the name of substance, as resulting from the qualities, has the qualities for self, since it is not perceived apart from the qualities.
