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THE ESSENCE OF JAINA SCRIPTURES
simply by its innate nature, so an existent (sat) is realized simply by its innate nature. For it has a form-of-being whose development is developed (nishpanna-nishpattimat) (parallel with siddha-siddhimat in the precedent paragraph) by its own innate nature, which has moreover (read sattatmana) existence for self. On the other hand, existence (satta) does not present itself as an object different from substance, so that the substance should be through inherence thereof something-existent (sat). And the existent (sat) and the existence (satta) are not different objects, (a) on the basis of yuta-siddhatva, “I because we do not see in them this mutual separability (read yuta-siddhatvas yadarshanat), as in the case of a stick and the bearer of the stick. Nor (b) does (the thesis) hold by way of mutual-inseparability. And, if one should object that it arises from (read upadyate) the notion “this in that” (ihedam), then we ask on what is this notion "this in that” based?—It is founded on differentiation (bheda). What is this differentiation? Is it of local nature (pradeshika) or (logical) non-identity (atadbhavika)? It is not local, since we have already rejected yuta-siddhatva.—If it is non-identity, that is given already by the saying "that which is a substance is not a quality.” But this differentiation, called non-identity, does not by itself suffice as the condition of the notion “this in that,” since this notion emerges or is submerged independently. If a substance is caused-to-beapproached (arpyate, cf. Tattva-dipika on PS 87 and the explication there given of “artha") by a modification, then emerges the differentiation of non-identity, “this substance possesses a quality,” “this is its quality,” “this upper-garment is white,” “this white quality," and so on (read ityadivat prapashyatah). But, when the substance is causedto-be-approached by a substance, then every unfolding of an impression (vasana) of a quality is lost in us, and regarding only “the suchlike substance," (cf PS 95) for instance a white upper-garment, the differentiation of non-identity is utterly submerged; and, since this differentiation is submerged, any notion based on it is submerged; and again, this being submerged any other object-an idea dependent on a-yuta-siddhatva-is submerged. Consequently the entire substance is left as an unity. On the other hand, when differentiation emerges, then, as it emerges, the notion conditioned by it emerges; and, when this notion emerges, the idea of a second object-due to inseparability (a-yuta-siddhatva)-emerges. But even then, emerging as a modification thereof, it is not separate from the object, as little as the water-wave
