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BOOK II: THE PRINCIPLE OF KNOWLEDGE
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substance, untouched by particular quality; (19) understanding that whose apprehension, i.e. particular awareness of things, is not a mark, a quality modification,” we conceive its being pure substance, untouched by particular modification; (20) understanding "that whose apprehension, i.e. general awareness of things, is not a mark, i.e. a cause of recognition,”102 we conceive its being pure modification, untouched by substance.
Now, in view of the question "How can there be bondage of the self, since, being incorporeal, it is without smoothness or roughness?," he propounds the prima facie opinion:
II.81. The corporeal, having qualities of colour and so on, is bound by mutual forms of touch (viz. smoothness and roughness): how can the self, the opposite thereof, bind material karman? (173)
On the part of two corporeal material substances, indeed, since they are associated with qualities, colour and so on, mutual bondage, due to a particular touch, smoothness or roughness as described, is in fact recognized: but on the part of self and karma-matter how is it recognized? Though the karma-matter, as associated with qualities, colour and so on, can have a particular touch, smoothness or roughness as described, yet, since the incorporeal self, as not being associated with qualities, colour and so on, cannot be credited with a particular touch, smoothness or roughness as described, we have inadequacy on the one side.
Now he states the approved view that there is bondage of the self, though incorporeal:
II.82. Just as, though devoid of colour and so on, it (the self] sees and knows substances having colour, etc. qualities; in this way, understand, it is bound with them. (174)
In the same way as, though deprived of colour and so on (the self], it sees and knows coloured substances and their qualities, similarly of course, though deprived of colour and so on, it is bound by karmamaterial, having colour, etc. For otherwise it is impossible to evade the further interrogation “How does it, being incorporeal, see and know the corporeal?” Nor is this made the subject of an example by reason of the difficulty of giving a solution: rather is it by means of an example made plain even down to the boy and the cowherd. Thus: as on the part of a boy or a cowherd, who sees and knows a clay bull or a bull, standing apart from them, there is not union with the bull,
