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BOOK II: THE PRINCIPLE OF KNOWLEDGE
281
For instance, the creation of the jar is the dissolution of the clod, since being appears as an innate nature of not being another being. And the dissolution of the clod is the creation of the jar, since notbeing appears as an innate nature of being another being. And both the creation and dissolution of jar and clod are the permanence of the clay, since the sameness (anvaya) only appears by means of the divergence (vyatireka) (For the terms anvaya and vyatireka of commentary on gatha 80). And the permanence of the clay is the creation and dissolution of jar and clod, since the divergences do not overpass, transgress or transcend the sameness.
And, if this is not accepted, it follows that the creation is something apart, the dissolution something apart, and the permanence again something else.
(I) In that case, since there is no cause for the origination of a pot when it asks only for creation, there would either be no coming into being (bhavani) whatever, or an origination of a non-existent.
(A) And thus, if the pot does not come into existence, there would be no arising of anything;
(B) in the case of the origination of a non-existent there would be origination of sky-flowers, etc.
(II) Likewise, since there is no cause for the destruction of the clod which is undergoing annihilation only, there would be either, no annihilation (samharani) whatever or the putting-an-end to a thingreally-existent (sat).
(A) And here, in the case of the clod's not being destroyed, there would be no annihilation of anything;
(B) in the case of the putting-an-end to an existent there would be an end to the conscious-being (samvid, i.e. the soul), and so on,
(III) Likewise, since in the clay, if admitting only continuance, there is no constancy, i.e. continuance, dominated by divergence, there would be no continuance (asthani), or merely the eternality of the momentary.
(A) In the case of the non-continuance of the clay there would be non-continuance of all existence;
(B) in the case of the eternality of the momentary there would be eternality of the momentary-contents-of-consciousness (chitta-kshana). 42
Consequently we must inevitably accept a substance characterized
A
