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BOOK II: THE PRINCIPLE OF KNOWLEDGE
317
on many beginningless, endless and uniterrupted parts,
Then no! Whence, indeed, could this oneness be, since there can be no simultaneity of that part, where the annihilation, and of the part, where the origination proceeds? And whence could there be stability, which abides in this oneness of annihilation and origination; since the annihilated part has totally disappeared, and the originating part is just attaining its self, which is brought into existence? This being so, the threefold set of characteristics comes to nought; kshanabhanga (universal-momentariness) is triumphant; eternal substance has its sunset; momentarily annihilated existence-forms (bhavas) raise their heads. Therefore, for fear lest all truth should become confused, we must necessarily search for something that has the occurrence, and that is its abode. Now this is the pradesha (infinitesimal-particle), because a correspondence (anu-vidhayitva) to presence and absence cannot belong to what is not pradesha (a-pradesha).
(D) If time thus has pradesha, why not agree that it contains an innumerable number of pradeshas, equal to the space of the universe, as the condition of its being one substance?
The reason is non-admission of modificational-time. It is the modification of an ultimate atom passing through the substantial-time, which covers only one pradesha, that we admit as the moment. If the substantial-time consisted of an innumerable number of pradeshas equal to the space of the universe, whence could that be established?
If it is urged that, even if this, as one total substance, possesses innumerable pradeshas, equal to the space of the universe, the moment might result from the ultimate atom passing through one pradesha of the substantial-time.
Not so, because an occurrence of a part cannot consistently be an occurrence of the whole. The moment is the minute occurrencepart of the whole-time object, not of such and such a single part. Moreover, it would follow that conglomeration in transverse directions conglomeration in vertical direction (cf. the introduction which Tattvadipika gives to 141). Thus, (the moving ultimate atom) first abides with one pradesha (of the supposed innumerable time-pradeshas), then with another, then again with another, so that conglomeration in transverse direction, becoming conglomeration in vertical direction, proves the substance to contain only one pradesha.
(E) Therefore, whoever does not wish to assert that a
