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BOOK II: THE PRINCIPLE OF KNOWLEDGE
285
origination, annihilation and permanence.
Now he considers the origination, annihilation and continuance of a substance through the modifications of one substance:
II.12. The substance, undifferentiated from the existent, evolves by itself from one quality into another; therefore it is said that the quality-modifications (guna paryaya) are indeed the substance. (104)
The quality-modifications are modifications of one substance, since the quality-modifications are one substance. For their being one substance may be explained by a sahakara (mango) fruit.
As the sahakara-fruit, which, evolving by itself from the green state into the yellowish [white, Faddegon] state, has its own existence affected by the successive states of green and yellowish [white, Faddegon] colour, is with these states of green and yellowish [white, Faddegon] colour one object and not a different object, inasmuch as its existence undifferentiated from them:
in the same manner the substance which, evolving by itself from the quality of the precedent condition into the quality of the subsequent condition, has its own existence affected by the qualities of these successive conditions, is with these qualities of successive conditions one substance and not a different substance, inasmuch as its existence is undifferentiated from them.
And, as the sahakara-fruit, originating with reference to the yellowish [white, Faddegon] colour, decaying with reference to the green colour, permanent in its being a sahakara-fruit, is origination, annihilation and stability in consequence of these being modifications of one thing (vastu):
in the same manner the substance, originating with reference to the quality of the subsequent state, decaying with reference to the quality of the precedent state, permanent in the quality of being a substance (dravyatva-guna), is origination, annihilation and stability in consequence of these being modifications of one substance.
Now he supplies a proof that existence and substance are not different objects:
II.13. If the substance is not an existent reality, then necessarily it is a non-existent; so how is it a substance: Or is it perhaps something else? Therefore the substance is itself existence. (105)
If the substance be not by characteristic nature an existent, then there is a double possibility: it is a non-existent, or it exists apart
