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BOOK II: THE PRINCIPLE OF KNOWLEDGE
283
destruction of the existent.43
(I) And in the case of mere production (A) there would be in each case an endless number of substances, stamped with an origination recurring every instant, or (B) there would occur the origination of a non-existent.
(II) And in the case of mere stability there would either be (A) the non-existence of any substance, since there would be no successively existing existences, or (B) kshanikatva (perpetual momentariness).
Hence origination, destruction and continuance must be dependent on the modifications, and the modifications on the substance, so that all this is merely one substance.
Now, rejecting a differentiation of origination, etc., with reference to moments-of-time (kshana), he explains that the very term dravya (substance) signifies dravyatva”, i.e. “that which by nature flows towards its modes":
II.10. The substance at one and the same moment (samaya) takes the forms, modes, names or states of origination, persistence and destruction, which certainly are inseparably rolled into one. Therefore all the three are indeed the substance. (102)
(Opponent:) “The moment of birth of a thing (vastu), since it is pervaded (vyapta) merely by this birth, is neither a moment of continuance nor a moment of annihilation. The moment of continuance is neither a moment of origination nor a moment of annihilation, since it luxuriates (durlalita) in the interspace of both. The moment of annihilation, since it belongs to something which becomes annihilated after previous origination and continuance (read utpadyavasthaya), is neither a moment of birth nor a moment of stability. Thus reasoned out, the differentiation of origination, etc., with reference to moments-of-time no doubt obtains an entrance into the mind. And, if it so enters, then it is admitted that substances arises by itself (atmana), persists by itself and perishes by itself.”
This is not proved. Originations, etc., belong merely to the evolutions; wherefore a differentiation with reference to the moments?
To wit, as, when the finishing of the pot, effected by the potter with stick, wheel and rag, is present, that moment of coming-intoexistence of the produced object is the same as the moment of annihilation of the clod and the same as the moment of persistence