________________
234
THE ESSENCE OF JAINA SCRIPTURES
other, then a distinguishing in the one in consequence of a process of distinguishing in the other, and an origination of distinction, bearing on objective-being (bhuti), etc., would be without any rule. Furthermore, knowledge evolves into all the distinguishable appearances which exist besides knowledge; and we may say that all the objects which are the causes of all the knowable appearances, which are (really) the effects of this self-evolving knowledge, in a certain way reside in knowledge. So then the forced supposition (klesha kalpana) of a separation of knower and knowledge is superfluous.'
Now he explains what knowledge is and what the knowable:
36. Therefore the soul is knowledge; and substance, explained as threefold, is the knowable. This substance then is the self and "the other" evolutions.
Since the soul itself evolves in the form of distinguishing and distinguishes by itself independently, therefore the soul alone is knowledge; for other substances cannot evolve and distinguish in this way.
But the knowable is substance, which is without beginning and end; for it is connected with the three aspects of time, inasmuch as it shows a varying series of modifications in past, present and future. And this substance, possessing the property of being knowable, is twofold, i.e. it is divided into the self and the other.” For we must accept such a twoness in the object of an experienced, which is aware of a distinction of the self and the other.
But in this paragraph the author discusses self-consciousness) how (it is asked) can there be a distinguishing of the self, since it is contradictory that an act should take place upon one's self? Well, what is this act and what the contradiction means? The act which is (supposed to be) contradictory is either origination or understanding (jnapti). An act of (spontaneous) origination, however, is contradictory: since according to the words of scripture not one thing originates from itself. But no refutation occurs with reference to an act in the form of understanding; for the difficulty here is removed by conformity with the act of illuminating. For when a lamp, as illuminator, illuminates another thing as illumin and, then for its own illumination we need not search for a second illumination, since we observe an act of illuminating on its own part; similarly, when the self, as distinguisher, distinguishes something else as distinguend, then for its own distinction
