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BOOK I: THE PRINCIPLE OF KNOWLEDGE
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(amurta) substances, such as the principles of motion and stationariness, material, but supra-sensorial substances, such as the ultimate atom, that which is hidden in respect of substance, e.g. time; that which is hidden in respect of place, e.g. the pradeshas of space locates outside the world; that which is hidden in time, e.g. nonpresent modifications; that which is hidden in respect of forms-ofbeing, namely fine (sukshma) modifications latent within gross (sthula) modifications; thus with reference to all things, distinguished as own and other.
Immediate knowledge indeed, bound to a single self, called the aksha (aksha, from which pratyaksha is derived, is taken as a synonym of atman), and having the immediacy of its manifested infinite purity and beginningless connection with the generality of perfect intelligence (siddha-chaitanya-samanya), does not search for exterior means (read itara-samagrim), enjoys infinity, because of its possession of infinite energies. Knowledge enjoying such prestige, seeing that the knowable appearances no more outgo knowledge than combustible appearances the fire, what can resist such knowledge? Therefore it is acceptable (upadeya).
But now he rebukes sensorial knowledge, cause of sensorial pleasure, as deserving rejection:
55. The soul in itself immaterial or incorporeal, 14 becoming incorporeal in material form and then, apprehending with this material (form or body), the material (world), sometimes knows and sometimes does not know that-which-is-fit-for-knowledge (yogya).
Sensorial knowledge requires a material instrument-of-perception (upalambhaka) and a material object-of-perception (upalabhya). The soul, in possession of this, although itself immaterial, occupying the material body, provided with the five sensories, apprehends with the material body, as instrument of perception, by way of the applications of its forces (bala)?s to the production of notion (inapti), the material thing, predominantly touch, etc., which, having acquired the propertyof-being-perceptible (upalabhyata), is fit-for-knowledge: and by this apprehension the soul sometimes—repeatedly—if pureness recurs in regard to it, grasps the object, but sometimes, owing to the lack of pureness, does not grasp, by reason of indirectness (parokshatva).
Indirect knowledge-based on an extreme unsteadiness in the self, which, in consequence of being enveloped in a knot of very dense
