________________ NATURE AND FORMS OF KNOWLEDGE 29 knowledge. The Nyaya, however, does not admit the Mimamsa contention that any knowlege becomes invalid simply because it refers to a previously known object (glhitagrahitaksta). According to it, what makes memory invalid (aprami) is the absence of the character of presentation (anubhuti) in it. Memory may, in some cases, correspond to real objects. Still it is not valid knowledge, since it does not correspond to given objects and does not arise out of the objects themselves (arthajanya). In memory we have not a cognition of given objects but a re-cognition of what were given, in the same form and order in which they once existed in the past and bave now ceased to exist. That form and order are vow past and therelore no longer real, so that between these and their memory-images we cannot speak of a correspondence to the given. Even when an object is first perceived and then immediately remembered, so that perception and immediate memory refer to one and the same object and are spoken of as equally true, we are to observe that the state of memory borrows its validity from the antecedent perception which produces and fashions it (yacitamandanapruya)As a matter of fact, however, the object ceases to be given and to be the operative cause of knowledge in memory. The recollection of long past or remote objects is clearly independent of the co-operation of these objects (anapeksitartha). Memory, being thus based on no given datum (anarthajanya), fails to give valid presentational knowledge (prama), and so, is not a source of knowledge (pramana).? An examination of the view that memory is not valid knowledge is postponed at this stage. We shall come to it after we bave got all that the Nyaya bas to say about prama and the pramunas. 1 TR and SS, pp 43-46 INM, pp 20-28
