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NYAYA THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE
is somehow presented to us. It cannot be said that we merely think of all smokes as a concept or general idea, and that there is no presentation or direct experience of them. We can think of such particular smokes as were previously experienced by us. But the idea of particular smokes always falls short of the class of smokes or all smokes. And there cannot be any idea of the class of smokes without a corresponding direct experience of it. It is only when, in perceiving one smoke as related to fire, all smokes are presented to us through the perception of the class-essence 'smokeness,' that we can legitimately ask the question Are all smokes or the class of smokes related to fire? Hence we conclude that sāmānyalaksana is a type of genuine perception It should, however, be borne in mind that we have not such a perception whenever we perceive any individual possessing a class-essence. It is only when the perception of the class-essence of an individual has a direct reference to the class of things to which it belongs that we have to admit a sāmānyalaksana perception of that class of things through the perception of the class-essence. In what cases other than those mentioned above there is such a reference is a matter of phenomenological observation wbich we need not discuss here
2. Jñānalakșana or acquired perception The second type of extraordinary perception is called jñānalakşaņa. It is the perception of an object which is in contact with sense through a previous knowledge of itself.' When on seeing something one says 'I see a piece of fragrant sandalwood,' he has an immediate knowledge or perception of its fragrance. This cannot be explained without the help of jñānalakṣaṇa. How can he perceive
Vìşayi yasya tasyazva vyāpāro pānalakşanah, BP., 65.
