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EXTRAORDINARY PERCEPTION
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between perception and inference is briefly this : Perception is the integral immediate consciousness of an object. Inference is a multiple mediated consciousness of an object which may be expressed as a this-therefore-that consciousness.
In view of the above distinction between perception and inference we cannot admit the Advaitin's contention that to recognise jñānalaksaņa as a form of perception is to obliterate the distinction between perception and inference. When we pass such judgments as 'the rose looks soft,' 'the stone looks hard,' we do not pass from the colour of the rose or the stone to its tactual quality. Likewise, when we say 'ice looks cold,' or 'the sandal looks fragrant,' there is no transition of thought from ice to coldness, or from the sandal to its fragrance. We do not say “ because ice, therefore cold,” or because sandal, therefore fragrant.' On the other hand, coldness or fragrance is a part of the presentation of the ice or the sandal. What we say is : “I see the cold ice or the fragrant sandal,” just as we say “we see the distant hill.” In the inference of fire from smoke, however, there is a transition of our thought from smoke to fire as two distinct objects. We never say “I see the fiery smoke." In fact, the fire is here only thought of by us and not presented to us. To recognise jñānalakṣaṇa, therefore, as a form of perception is not to ignore the fundamental distinction between perception and inference.
It may indeed be contended here that while in the visual perception of a rose or a stone or a block of ice, there is a presentation of some tactual quality, there is no such presentation of fragrance in the visual perception of sandalwood. To this we are to say that if the eye can present a tactual quality like softness or hardness or coldness wbich it is not fitted, by nature, to perceive, there is no inherent impossibility in the eye being made competent to perceive
