Book Title: Nyaya Theory of Knowledge
Author(s): S C Chateerjee
Publisher: University of Calcutta

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Page 393
________________ 376 NYAYA THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE called višesya or the substantive wbich is regarded as the seat or locus of some quality. It may thus be called the determinandum or what is presented to be determined and characterised by thought. In relation to it, the other term is called vidheya or that which is asserted about the subject and is therefore a predicate It is known also as the višeşana or the adjective which is referred to the subject. It is that which determines the subject and may thus be called the determinans in relation to it. On this analysis of it, a sentence corresponds to a proposition in Western logic. But unlike the propositions of Formal Logic, the sentence has no need for a copula. That there must be a copula or a verb in a sentence is not admitted by the Naiyáyıkas and many other Indian thinkers. The analysis of a sentence into the subject, the predicate and the copula is repudiated by the Naiyāyıkas as utterly groundless. We can very well express a complete meaning without the copula, as when we say “parvato vahnimān." That the copula, as some form of the verb 'to be,' is not an essential part of the proposition is also recognised by modern logicians like Bradley,? Bosanquet and Johnson. The Naiyāyıkas go further than this and hold that no verb is necessary for a sentence. It may be said that a verb is implied, if not expressly mentioned, in a sentence. When we say 'a fiery hill,' or ' a red colour,' we imply the verb 'exists' or 'is'. For the Naiyāyikas, however, such verbs stand for a subjective mode of our assertion, but not for any part of the asserted fact or content" The 'bull as fiery, or the 1 Kriyárahitain na vākya mastītyādihastu prācām pravādo Diryuktıkatvādasradd. heyah, Sabdaśukte-prakāsıkā, p 28 2 Principles of Logic, Vol 1, p 21 3 Logic, Vol I, p 81. 4 Logic, Pt I, pp 10-11 6 C SH Mellope, Introductory Text-Book of Logic, p. 10 There is no separate existence in thought corresponding to the separate existence of the copula in the typical proposition, SS P.'

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