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NYAYA THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE
is predicated of C. This will mean that A has the attribute of being like B, and C has the attribute of being greater than D. But being like B' is not a quality of A, nor
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the
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being greater than D' of C, in the same way in which the red colour is a quality of the ball. Similarly, Vedantin's identity proposition this is that man' can hardly be reduced to the subject-predicate form For the Naiyayikas, this proposition is predicative in so far as it means that this man is characterised by a past existence.' In it a man's existence at some other time and space is predicated as a character of his present existence. Although the proposition may be interpreted in this way, yet it loses its real force when so interpreted. The proposition expresses a judgment of recognition (pratyabhijñā) In recognition we are primarily interested in the identity of a man from the past to the present. To recognise a man as that Devadatta is to know not only that he was known before, but that he is identical in the past and the present. Hence the proposition this 18 that man' does not characterise a man by his past existence and is, therefore, non-predicative l'inally, the sentences which mean action cannot be called predicative propositions by any stretch of imagination. The sentence a dog runs is not a predicative proposition, because there 18 in it no subject-predicate relation between two terms. To make it predicative it may be converted into the logical form a dog is a running animal.' But this form of the sentence does not bring out its real sense. It is an altogether different proposition, and a false proposition too, for dogs do not always run. Similarly, sentences expressing commands or imperatives are not predicative propositions in any sense or form. Thou shalt not steal,'
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pray to God' are sentences which enjoin certain duties on us, but do not assert any relation, predicative or otherwise, between two ideas or things.
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