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OF SENTENCES
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any other source of knowledge? It cannot be a case of perception, because I cannot directly see the river's depth nor measure it before going into its water. It cannot be explained by memory, for there is no previous experience corresponding to my present knowledge of the river's depth. I cannot now remember that the river is fordable because I have not perceived it to be such in the past. It cannot be said that my present knowledge of the river as fordable is the result of the synthesis of iny ideas of a river and of fordability acquired from the previous experiences of other fordable rivers. Even if I have such ideas or memoryimages from previous experience, they will not explain my knowledge of this river as fordable, because there is no previous experience in relation to it. 1
Next we are to consider whether sabda or verbal testimony can be reduced to inference It bas been held by many thinkers, both Indian and European, that knowledge from testimony is really a form of inference. The Buddhist logicians hold the generally accepted view that testimony is a kind of inference, because in it we infer the truth or falsity of a statement from the character of the person who makes that statement But this view makes a confusion between two different questions To determine whether testimony is a separate source of knowledge or not, we are only to see if it gives us a true knowledge of facts, and not bow its truth is known oi tested by us We can very well know the meaning of a sentence even before we enquire into its source, or when its source cannot be known. In fact, testimony is the source of the greater part of our knowledge of the world. Thus the Buddhist contention falls to the ground. The Vaiścșikas try to reduce testimony
1 So'yain niyantntarthatvāppu pratyaksam na cgpumā Da căsau smrtih samānākāra-gainskāräprabbavatvāt, Sabdaśaktı prakästhā, pp 3-4
2 Vide NV., 1 1 7. Cf Vākyagavanantaramevn hyāptánāptajñānānapekşaneva padārtbairvākyārtho 'vaganyato, SD, p. 73.
