Book Title: Nyaya Theory of Knowledge
Author(s): S C Chateerjee
Publisher: University of Calcutta

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Page 394
________________ 377 " 'colour as red' is the content of our assertion. The verb is or exists stands for no objective content. Hence a sentence does not require a verb as an essential part of its content. So also we may have a proposition without the copula or the verb to be.' But we should observe that although the sentence as a predicative judgment (visesyavisesanavagahı) corresponds to a proposition, yet it is in itself wider than a proposition. There are sentences which do not express any relation between subject and predicate, or in which there may not be any subject or predicate, e.g. a dog runs,' 'go there,' etc. These are sentences, but not propositions expressing a relation between two terms. The Naiyayikas, however, take the sentence as equivalent to a proposition. 6 · It will appear from the above that, according to the Naiyayikas, the import of a sentence or proposition is the predication of an attribute with regard to some thing or things. It expresses the relation between a substantive and an adjective (visesyaviseṣana). The substantive is some thing or real, while the adjective is some other fact or real found in relation to it. Hence we may say that both the subject and the predicate are real facts forming one complex whole. The proposition does not bring the one intc relation with the other, but finds them as related. The Naiyayikas, therefore, cannot agree with Bradley' and Bosanquet who hold that a proposition is the reference of an ideal content to reality, or that a proposition characterise some part of reality, with which we are in immediate contact, by referring an ideal content to it. For them, the predicate is not an ideal content but a real fact. In the proposition 'the ball is red,' the redness is as much a perceived fact as the ball, and so also their relation is no OF SENTENCES 1 Principles of Logic, Vol I, p 10. Logic, Vol. I, p 83. 48 (1117B)

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