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GROUNDS OF INFERENCE
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include the following steps (1) the knowledge of vyāpti or the universal relation between the middle and major terms, e.g. all cases of smoke are cases of fire; (2) the perception of the minor term as qualified by the middle term, e.g. the hill is a case of smoke; (3) a revival of the impression of vyāpti previously acquired, without any necessary recollection of it; and (4) the conclusion that the minor term is related to the major term, e.g. the hill is a case of fire. 1
According to the modern Naiyayikas, the linga or the middle term cannot be the karana or operative cause of inference. The middle term may be a thing of the present or the past or the future. But it cannot function in an inference when past or future The middle term cannot lead to the conclusion except through the knowledge of vyaptı or the universal relation between it and the major term. Hence the knowledge of vyapti or the universal relation between the middle and major terms should be taken as the special cause (karana) of inference. But the knowledge of vyāpt does not immediately lead to the conclusion. It has for its function (vyāpāra) a synthetic view of the middle term as related to the major, on the one hand, and the minor, on the other (lingaparāmarśa). I bis is called trtiyalıngaparāmarśa, i.e. a consideration of the middle term for the third time. The middle term, e.g. smoke, is known first when we acquire the knowledge of its invariable relation with the major term 'fire' in the kitchen, etc. It is known for the second time in relation to the minor term, e.g. the hill. It is considered for the third
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1 Vide Siddhantamuktavali with Dinakari, pp 288 89 Cf Vedanta-Paribhāṣā, Chapter, II "evam ca ayam dhumavan' iti paksadharinatājñāne' dhūmo vahnivyāpys' ityanubhavabıtasamskarodbodhe ca satı vahnıman 'ityanumitirbhavati, na tu madhye vyaptismaranamh tajjanyam vahnivyapyadhumavānayam' ityādi viseṣanavisistajñānam
? Vyāpārastu paramarśaḥ karanam vyaptıdhirbhavet, etc., BP. and SM., 66-67
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