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of the cow's likeness to the gavaya, the paksa, i.e. the cow cannot be an object of perception, and the linga, i.e. the likeness of the gavaya would be present not in the paksa 'cow,' but in the gavaya. Further, when from the one likeness we know the other, we are not conscious of any inferring, but of comparing. Introspection tells us that the actual process of reasoning involved in the second knowledge of likeness is not inferential Similarly, when we perceive a horse and know it to be unlike the cow, our knowledge of the unlikeness is perceptual. But when from this we conclude that the cow, not now perceived, is unlike the horse, we depend, not on perception and inference, but on upamana or comparison Thus the Mimāmsaka and the Vedantist admit that there is a perceptual element in upamana. But they go further and prove that the reasoning about likeness and unlikeness, based on some perception, cannot be fully explained by perception or inference. It constitutes an independent source of valid knowledge (pramāna), to which they give the name of upamana
The Naiyayikas criticise and reject the above view on the following grounds First, they point out that it violates the ordinary rule of upamana or comparison In all cases of upamana we compare the unfamiliar object with something well-known in order to understand it better. In the above view the well-known cow is compared with the strange garaya But this cannot give us any new knowledge about the cow which is already too well-known to us. Secondly, the knowledge of the cow's likeness may be explained by memory and so does not require a separate source of knowledge like upamana. When we perceive the gavaya we are reminded of the cow and not of other things. The reason is that there are certain points of resemblance between the two and that these were previously perceived
NYAYA THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE
1 Vide SD, pp 74-76; VP., Ch III.
