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a wrong
as a form of pratyabhijñā or recognition rests on assumption. They seem to think that a knowledge is explained when we explain the constituent parts of it. But to explain the component parts of knowledge is not to explain knowledge itself. To say that it is so is the fundamental error of all associationist theory of knowledge. If it were really so, the Jaina view of pratyabhijña itself as a distinct type of knowledge will have to be discarded, since it is constituted by perception and memory. On this assumption we may reduce all kinds of knowledge to perception, since the constituents of all knowledge ultimately come from perception. That we recognise other kinds of knowledge than perception is due to the fact that the combination of elements derived from perception involves new principles which take us beyond perception. We shall consider hereafter if the Naiyayıka's upamāna involves any new principle of combination so as to justify us in treating it as a new kind of knowledge.
NYAYA THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE
3. The classification of upamana
Upamāna was at first regarded as only of one kind, namely, as the knowledge of a thing as denoted by a word through its similarity to a well-known object of experience. Later Naiyayikas, however, distinguished between different kinds of upamāna, according as they are based on the knowledge of dissimilarity between things, or on that of their peculiar properties Thus the Naiyāyikas generally recognise three kinds of upamana or knowledge by comparison, namely, sadharmyopamāna, vaidharmyopamāna and dharmamatropamāna. '
In sadharmya-upamāna we start from the description of an unknown object given in terms of its similarity to a well
1 Vule TH & 98, pp 86-88
