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NYAYA THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE
relation,' while in upamāna it is a feeling of similarity, etc. In upamāna we are not conscious of inferring but of comparing. Inference is distinguished from perception because our cognitions are distinctly different in the two cases. Just for the same reason upamāna must be distinguished from perception, inference and testimony."
3.
Conclusion
The question discussed in the Nyāya theory of upamāna is this. How do we know the denotation of a word or a class-name? There are various ways in which we may know it. In the first place, the objects denoted by the word gavaya may be pointed out to us by any person who knows its denotation and we may be told that these objects are denoted by the word. In this case we know the denotation of the word from direct testimony, because here in the presence of the denoted objects we are told by some authority. These are the objects denoted by the word gavaya.' But it is not always possible for us to know the denotation of words from direct testimony, for we cannot always be brought to the presence of the denoted objects and told that they are denoted by such and such words. There are, however, other ways open to us to know the denotation of words. We may know the denotation of a word from its accepted definition or from a description of the objects denoted by it. Thus from the definition of the word 'man' as a rational animal we understand what animals are denoted by it. Similarly, from the description of the garaya as an animal resembling the cow, we can recognise the class of animals called gavaya. Now the question is : What is the nature of the process of knowledge involved in our
63, Dinakari and Ramarudri on
1 Vide Tarkasangraha-Dipikä-Prakāśa, p Siddhantamuktavali, pp 354-55.
