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NYAYA THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE
When we see two things together we perceive that they are similar or dissimilar to each other. As to the second factor, namely, the knowledge of the denotation of words, it is derived from the statements of authoritative persons, i.e. testimony. Hence upamāna need not be given the status of an independent source of knowledge. Now the Naiyāyikas point out that the Buddhist contention rests on a complete misunderstanding of the real nature of an argument by upamāna or comparison. The vital point in upamāna is neither the perception of similarity nor the verbal knowledge of the denotation of a word, but the recognition of certain objects, not known before, as belonging to a class ; and denoted by a class-concept. The similarity of those objects to other things may be perceived and the classconcept may be given by testimony. But the application of the concept to a particular class of things cannot be due to perception or testimony. Hence upamūna cannot be reduced to perception and testimony."
In the Sārkhya ? and the Vaisesikasystem upamāna is explained as a form of inference. It is here admitted that the Naiyāyika's upamāna is neither the perceptual nor the verbal cognition of the similarity between two objects, e.g. the cow and the gavaya. On the other hand, upamāna really aims at the knowledge of the denotation of a word or class-concept. But this can very well be explained as due to inference. Analysing the Naiyāyıka's upamāna we get three component factors. First, there is the communication of some knowledge about the denotation of a word by authoritative statements. This is obviously a case of knowledge from testimony and is in the form of the sentence the word gavaya denotes animals resembling the cow. Secondly, there is the observation
1 Vade NV, 1.16 2 Vide Tattoakaumudi and Avaranavärini, 5, 3 Vide PS, p. 109.
