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THE FALLACIES OF INFERENCE
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ultimately on the validity of the hetu or the reason employed in it. So also the members of a syllogism turn out to be right or wrong according as they elaborate a right or wrong reason. The fallacies of inference ultimately arise out of the fallacious reason. So the Naiyāyikas bring the fallacies of inference under the fallacies of the reason (hetvābhāsa) and consider a separate treatment of the inferential fallacies due to the propositum, example, etc. (pratijñābhāsa, dęstāntābhāsa) as unnecessary and superfluous.
Now the question is What is a fallacious middle (hetu)? How are we to distinguish between a valid and an invalid middle ? Literally speaking, hetvābhāsa or the fallacious middle is one that appears as, but really is not, a valid reason or middle term of an inference. It appears as a valid ground of inference because it satisfies some of the conditions of a valid middle term But on closer view it is found to be fallacious because it does not fulfil all the conditions of a valid ground of inference. As we have seen before, there are five conditions of the hetu or the middle term of an inferenee. First, the middle term must be a characteristic of the minor term (pakşadharmatā). Secondly, It must be distributively related to the major term, i.e. the major must be present in all the instances in which the middle is present (sapakşasattva). Thirdly, and as a corollary of the second condition, the middle term must be absent in all cases in which the major is absent (vipakşāsattva). Fourthly, the middle term must not relate to obviously contradictory and absurd objects like the coolness of fire, etc. (abādhitavișayatva). Fifthly, it must not itself be validly contradicted by some other ground or middle term (asatpratipakṣatua). Of these five conditions, the third does not apply to the middle term of a kevalānvayi inference,
1 Vede TR., p. 236; NM., p. 572. 9 Vide NV., 1.2.4.
