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NYAYA THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE
proposition involved in inference. These different kinds of inference we shall have to consider one after another.
All inferences must have one of two ends in view. They are meant either for the acquisition of some new knowledge on our part or for the demonstration of a known truth to others. Accordingly, all inferences are classed under the two heads of svārtha or inference for oneself and parārtha or inference for others.' An inference is called svārtha when it aims at the knowledge of an unperceived object on the part of a man who employs that inference. In this kind of inference a man seeks only to reach the conclusion for himself by relating it to the major and minor premises. This is illustrated in the case of a man who infers the existence of fire in a hill because be first perceives a mass of smoke in it and then remembers that there is a universal relation between smoke and fire. On the other hand, an inference is parārtha when it aims at demonstrating the truth of the conclusion to other people. In this inference there is a justification of the conclusion through a justification of the middle term that leads to it. It is bere specifically pointed out that the same middle terrn which is universally related to the major is also present in the minor ter.n. The conclusion is thus found to follow necessarily from a synthesis of the major and minor premises. This synthesis is embodied in a third premise which relates the minor, middle and major terms of the inference. A parārtha anumāna is illustrated when a man having inferred the existence of fire in a hill lays it down as a thesis and proves it as a conclusion following from the major and minor premises and their combination into a third premise. ?
1 Taccānumāpam dvividhani, gyártham Parártham ceti, TB, p 9. 2 T8, pp 46.49,
