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NYAYA THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE
It will be observed here that in the first form of the syllogism given above, the inference starts from the conclusion, and then the premises are stated to justify it. In the second form, the premises are given first and then the conclusion is drawn from them That inferences may take both forms has been recognised by some modern Western logicians like H. W. B. Joseph, L. S. Stebbing, 2 F M. Chapman and Paul Henle. But it will be admitted by all that while the second form (in which the premises come first and the conclusion last) has a rigidly formal character, it is the first (in which the conclusion comes first and the premises last) that is ordinarily used by us when we actually infer anything “In ordinary speech we more often state the conclusion first and then state the premises. This gives emphasis to the conclusion and also aids in showing the direction of our argument."' 4 If this be so, then we must say that the Njāya form of inference, in which the conclusion-to-be-proved comes first and the premises last, is the natural or actual form of reasoning But it should be remarked that the first proposition cannot be strictly called the conclusion, since a conclusion is what follows from certain grounds or premises. So it seems better to speak of it, like the Naiyāyika, as just a pratijñā or probandum, i.e. something to be proved This proposition stands out as the conclusion when it is seen to follow logically from certain other premises That there must be two such premises, viz. the major and the minor, all logicians would readily admit. And that there must also be a third premise to synthesise these two seems to be admitted only by a logician like Bradley" It will, however, be admitted by
1 Introduction to Logic, pp 255-66 ? Modern Introduction to Logic, pp 82, 84 3 Chapman and Henle, The Fundamentals of Logic, p. 98 4 Ibid 5 The Principles of Logic, Vol. I, p. 269.
