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NYAYA THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE
perception is to reduce ordinary inference to perception. If the fragrance of sandalwood be perceived because we have a previous knowledge of it as connected with sandalwood, then in the inference of fire from smoke, the fire may be said to be perceived since we have also a previous knowledge of it as related to smoke. There is nothing to distinguish between the two cases. In the one we have a perception of sandalwood and a previous knowledge of its relation to fragrance. In the other, we have a perception of smoke and a similar knowiedge of its relation to fire Hence if the fragrance be in extraordinary contact with sense and so perceived, there may be such an extraordinary perception of fire and, for the matter of that, of all objects of inference So the Vedānta holds that our knowledge of the fragrance of sandalwood, seen at a distance, is due to inference and not any extraordinary perception like the Naiyāyıka's jñānalaksana."
Now let us consider whether the knowledge of the fragrant sandal that is involved in the judgment " I see a fragrant sandalwood ” is really a case of perception as held by the Naiyāyıkas, or a case of inference as urged by the Vedāntins. Students of Western philosophy will readily recognise that such knowledge is of the same kind as what is called “complication" by some psychologists. The judgment " I see a fragrant sandalwood " is in fact equivalent to the judgment “ The sandalwood looks fragrant." And this is really another instance of what Stout, Ward and Wundt call “complication” and illustrate by such judgments as “ Ice looks cold," " The armour looks hard, smooth and cold.” 2 We may go further and say that the Naiyāyıka's jñānalakṣaṇa is similar to the visual perception
1 VP , Cb 1
2 Vide Stout, Manual of Psychology, p Psychology, pp 285-86.
102, Wundt, Human and Animal
