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NYAYA THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE
of reality. Here then the object of perception is not koown as a particular related to a certain universal. It is not judged as an individual belonging to a certain class and bearing that class-name Hence nirvikalpaha is the knowledge of an object as not characterised in any way (nışpı akāraka).' It is an apprehension of the object as 'something,' but not as related to a class and called by a name (nāmajātyādiyojanāhīnam ... kiñcididamıtı). Hence it is not a judgment of the object in terms of the subjectpredicate relation (varsiștyūnavagāhı). On the other hand, it is a simple apprehension of the existence and attubutes of an object without any corresponding judyinent of it in words, or by way of predication
Accuiding to some linguistic thinkers there cannot be any nirvikalpaha perception in the sense of an unverbalised experience as explained above They hold that we cannot think things except through words. All objecis are inse parably connected with the words by which they are denoted. To cognise a thing is to know it as such-and-such and so to relate it to a denotative word (vācakaśabda). Likewise, we can act in relation to a thing only when we know it precisely as of this or that kind, 2. e. determine it by means of a class-name. In fact, all our coynitions are embodied in vei bal propositions, such as ' I know a colour,'
I have a taste,' 'It is a smell,' and so on. All cognitions being thus inseparable from verbal expressions, there can be no niruzkalpaka or unverlalısed cognition The NyāyaVašeşikas repudiate the linguistic contention on the following grounds. In the case of children and dumb persons there is undoubtedly a knowledge of many objects, but no verbal expression of that knowledge. Even in the case
1 Nimajátyádıyo.apărabitam vaiśıştjäna va gāhi nisprakärukam dirvikalpakaw, TC , 1, p 809.
Nirvikalpakam videşyaprakárådırabitem vastusvarūpamátrajñādam, TM., Oh II. 3 NB., 1, 1, 4, MB., 189,
