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THREE MODES OF ORDINARY PERCEPTION
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universal (sāmānyamätra), or of pure being (sattā). Our first cognition of a thing is not merely an apprebension of its unity, but also of its differences. When we perceive anything, its manifoldness is as much manifest to consciousness as its unitary character. It is cognised as a unity of many parts, qualities and aspects. Likewise, if nothing but mere being (saltā) be the content of immediate apprehension, we do not know how to account for our knowledge of the particulars (višeşa) of experience. Further, pure being which is nothing in particular cannot be the object of our knowledge' Hence we are to admit that in nirvikalpaka perception there is a cognition of both the universal and the particular, the generic and specific properties of an object as such ? It is a knowledge of the perceived object with all the wealth of its concrete characters in themselves. It cognises the universal or the class-essence present in the object of perception as well as its colour, form, structure and other specific characteristics. Thus the nirvikalpaka or indeterminate perception of an orange is the cognition which is produced immediately after the contact of the senses with the object, and which manifests its generic and specific properties in their isolation It gives us a knowledge of the orange, not as orange, but as the grouping of a certain colour, taste, smell, etc., with a certain universal called orangeness. But while both the universal and the particulars constituting an object are cognised in nirvikalpaka perception, they are not brought under the substantiveadjective relation (višeşyaviseşanasambandhānavagāhi). In nirvikalpaka perception these are cognised as unrelated units
1 Ibid
9 Sämänyaviseşeşu svarūpålocanamätram pratyaksam, PS., p. 187, birrakalpakam ... såmauyam videgain cobhyamapı ghnáti, NK., p 189,
SM., 58. • Avgapa lebyam jätyädisvarūpå vagabi na tu jätyādināın mitho visesa Qaviersya. bli& våvagabītı, NVT', p 185,
