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NYAYA THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE
of this or that particular kind. On the other hand, the perception of the same object, in the case of an adult who knows cows as a class, will be savikalpaka in so far as the object is here further determined and definitely known as belonging to the class of cows. Savihalpaka and nirvikalpaka perceptions are thus cognitions, not of the characterised and uncharacterised, but of the more or less definitely characterised object.
The Cārvākas, the Sābolikas and the Jainas go further than Rāmānuja and hold that nirvikalpaka perception is not real in any sense. According to the Jainas, all true knowledge must be a definite and an assured cognition of objects (vyavasāyātmakam jñānam). What distinguishes true knowledge from doubt, error and the rest is the fact that it is a firm belief which is also true. It is a definite judginent of au oluject as this and not as ibat. In it there is a definite affirmation or denial that an object is or is not such-andsuch. In the so-called nirvikalpaka perception, however, there is no such definite assertion of anything about any object Hence it cannot be recognised as a form of valid knowledge. Furtber, all knowledge being implicit in and manifested by the self, perception is only conditioned and not produced by the function of the senses Every perception, just when it occurs, will be a complete manifestation of the object. In perception there need not be a transition from an initial stage of vague and unorganised sense-impressions to that of distinct and determinate knowledge. All true perceptions are, therefore, determinate (savikalpaka) cognitions of objects as they really are in themselves.*
The same conclusion has been reached by the Sābdikas or grammarian philosophers on the ground of the intimate
i Pratyakfasya Dirvikalpakagavikalpakabhedsbbonusya da dirviseşavastupi pram pabbi vab, etc., Sribhäsyo, 1.11
Vide Prameyakamalamartanda, 1. 3 Tapniscayatmakar samáropa viruddbatvadanumanavat, ibid, 8. 4 Ibid., p. 8.
