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NYAYA THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE
which refer respectively to the two aspects of an object as' thin' and 'that,' or as present and past.
The Jainas take pratyabhijñā to mean recognition in the sense of both understanding the nature of an object and knowing that it was perceived before. To recognise a thing is to know that it has this or that property, or that it is the same as what was seen before. It is not true to say that pratyabhijñā is a dual cognition consisting of perception and memory. Although conditioned by perception and memory, it is a new kind of knowledge which cannot be resolved into them The testimony of introspection clearly tells us that pratyabhrjñā is a untary cognition and a distinct type of knou ledge What the Vaijāyikas call upamāna or comparison is, according to the Jainas, a form of pratyabhijñā as understood by them.”
According to the Naiyāyikas, pratyabhijñā con-ists in knowing that a thing now perceived is the same as what was perceived before. That pratyabhijñā or recognition, in the second sense, is a single psychosis appears clearly from the fact that it refers to one and the same object The cognitions of a jar and a cloth are two different psychoses, because they are evidently relatel to two different objectives. Recognition refers to only one thing and is therefore a simple and unitary cognition. The unique cause (karana) of the phenomenon of recognition is constituted by the senses and the effects of past experience. Recognition is brought about hy sense-impressions as modified by the effects of previous experience of an object. It gives us the knowledge of an object as existing in the present and as qualified hy its relation to the past.“ A thing's relation to past time
I NM, pp 448-49 1 Vide Prameyakamalamārtanda, pp 97-100
3 Bo'yam Devadatta ityatītavartamāpakālavıślatavīşayakam jāpar pratyabbijna, Mstabhāgini, p 25
4 Samskåraqabitamindriyamasyāḥ pratiteh karanam etc, NM , P 459 6 Atitakalavikiato vartamánakālāvacchiopascartha etasyāmavabbåsate, ibid.
